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ESSAY
READING CLARENCE THOMAS
Kendall Thomas*
The state is INHERENTLY racial, every state institution is a RACIAL institution, and the entire social order is equilabrated (unstably) by the state to
preserve the prevailing racial order.
-Omi & Winant'
Several years ago, a special issue of The New Yorker entitled "Black in
America" included an extraordinary profile of U.S. Supreme Court Justice
Clarence Thomas.2 Authored by Jeffrey Rosen, the article begins with an
account of Justice Thomas's interventions in two of the most important
cases decided during the Court's previous term. In the first of these cases,
Missouri v. Jenkins, the Court was called upon to define the constitutional
scope and limits of the federal judicial power to address racial concentration in Kansas City's public schools through salary increases and the creation of magnet programs.3 In the second case, Adarand v. Pena, the Court
was asked to determine the constitutionality of race-based affirmative action requirements in federal construction contracts.4 Those of you who follow the Court's work will recall that in both cases the Supreme Court
struck down the programs in question on the ground that the affirmative
action and school desegregation plans violated the equal protection components, respectively, of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United

States Constitution.
Rosen reports that in each case, Clarence Thomas played a crucial role
in shaping both the Court's reasoning and its result. Although Thomas had
* Nash Professor of Law and founding Co-Director of the Center for the Study of Law and
Culture at Columbia University. B.A. Yale University, 1978; J.D. Yale Law School, 1982.
1.

MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES: FROM

THE 1960s TO THE 1990s, 77-94 (1994).
2. Jeffrey Rosen, Moving On, THE NEW YORKER, April 29 & May 6, 1996, at 66-73.

3. Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995) (striking desegregation plan that included racial
balancing that went beyond restoring rights of victims of past discriminatory conduct). In Missouri v. Jenkins, the Supreme Court rejected a court-ordered "magnet school" remedy intended
to attract students from outside a district with schools that were 80-90 percent African-American.
The majority opinion found that the segregation to be alleviated was a result of post-Brown
"white flight" and not of any de jure segregation that would justify a desegregation remedy. In a
concurring opinion, Justice Thomas discussed Brown at length and rejected the view that there
could not be an equal opportunity for education in a school that was predominantly or exclusively
African-American. Justice Souter argued in the primary dissent that segregation which existed at
the time of Brown was never corrected in this particular school district and that a "magnet
school" remedy would be justified in addressing the remaining segregation.
4. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (condemning racial classifications in federal contracting programs).
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declined to engage the lawyers in oral argument before the Court in the
school desegregation case, when the Justices took up the case in private
discussion, he intervened vigorously.
Interestingly, Thomas framed his case for invalidation of the Kansas
City plan in the most personal and autobiographical terms. In Rosen's account, "Thomas spoke fervently of his own youthful struggles with the reality of Jim Crow. I am the only one at this table who attended a segregated
school, Thomas reportedly said. And the problem with segregation was not
that we didn't have white people in our class. The problem was that we
didn't have equal facilities. We didn't have heating, we didn't have books,
and we had rickety chairs. All society owed us was equal resources and an
equal opportunity to make something of ourselves."' 5 Rosen goes on to
note that "Thomas invoked the famous footnote in Brown v. Board of Education,6 in which Chief Justice Earl Warren cited works of social science to
suggest that the greatest evil of segregation was the feeling of inferiority
that it engendered in black students. Thomas disagreed." 7 For Thomas,
"[t]he evil of segregation was that black students had inferior facilities, not
that they were denied the chance to go to school with white students ....
All my classmates and I wanted, Thomas concluded, was the choice to attend a mostly black school or a mostly white school, and to have the same
resources in whatever school we choose." 8
Rosen recounts that Justice Thomas made a similarly autobiographical
appeal during the Court's deliberations in the Adarand case.
He talked about his grandfather, who ran an ice-and-oil delivery service
in Jim Crow-era Savannah. His grandfather had worked hard, Thomas
declared; he never asked for handouts from the state. He hadn't made a
great living, and his business had been restricted to black neighborhoods,
but he had not needed affirmative action to get his contracts. Thomas
reportedly went on to say that affirmative action, like segregation, is inherently wrong, because it is premised on the patronizing belief that
blacks are inherently inferior. Having survived the ordeal of segregation,
Thomas ...knew from experience that black communities and black families often flourished in the face of adversity. The best way to atone for
the past wrongs, he insisted, was to take the state out of the business of
racial classifications entirely. The Constitution, he said, should be colorblind. 9
5. Rosen, supra note 1, at 66.
6. See Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, Shawnee County, Kan., 347 U.S. 483, 494

(1954). J. Warren notes that the extent of psychological knowledge has shifted dramatically since
the Court's ruling at the time of Plessy v. Ferguson. To that end, he cites to a variety of authorities as partial justification for the Court's ruling in Brown. These authorities cited to in a footnote
include: K. B. Clark, Effect of Prejudice and Discrimination on Personality Development
(Midcentury White House Conference on Children and Youth, 1950); WITMER AND KOTINSKY,
PERSONALITY IN THE MAKING (1952), c. VI; Deutscher and Chein, The Psychological Effects of
Enforced Segregation:A Survey of Social Science Opinion, 26 J. PSYCHOL. 259 (1948); Chein,
What are the PsychologicalEffects of Segregation Under Conditions of Equal Facilities?,3 INT. J.
OPINION AND ATIITUDE RES. 229 (1949); BRAMELD, EDUCATIONAL COSTS, IN DISCRIMINATION
AND NATIONAL WELFARE (MacIver, ed., 1949), 44-48; FRAZIER, THE NEGRO IN THE UNITED
STATES (1949), 674-681. See generally MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA (1944).
7. Rosen, supra note 1, at 66.

8. Id.
9. Id. at 66-67.
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The most fascinating revelation in the Rosen account of Thomas's interventions in the Court's discussions of Adarand and Jenkins is the way his
efforts to affect the outcome in these cases depended as much on autobiographical appeals to black identity and experience as they did on the con-

tent of his ideas and arguments. In this respect, Thomas' reported tactics
during the Court's private conferences are at odds with the vision of the
judicial role to which he has publicly claimed to be committed. Thomas has
often complained that he has been subjected to unfair and illegitimate

forms of criticism since his appointment to the Court, criticisms from which
the other Justices have been spared. He has bitterly accused his detractors
of underhanded ad hominem attacks, for unjustly focusing attention on
who he is rather than what he says. During a speech in May of 1993 at

Mercer University, for example, Thomas condemned the "new intolerance" of "damning the dissenters by skewering his character rather than by
substantively criticizing his views." 1
What I find so revealing about The New Yorker profile is the evident
ease with which Justice Thomas forgets to practice what he preaches. The

Rosen report thus confirms what some critics have suspected all along:
Clarence Thomas owes his increasing influence over the Supreme Court's
antidiscrimination docket to the very rhetoric of character and personality
that he finds so objectionable when it is directed against him by his critics.
To be sure, we have seen all this before. Thomas adopted much the same
strategy during the explosive Senate Judiciary Committee hearings that en-

ded in his appointment to the Court.11 With his ascension to the Court,
however, Thomas is now in a position to play the politics of personality on
a much larger stage, and in a drama that involves nothing less than the fate

of racial justice in American constitutional law.
The chief lesson I take from The New Yorker article is this: students of

the Supreme Court cannot hope for anything like an adequate account of
Clarence Thomas's racial jurisprudence if we restrict ourselves to substan-

tive criticism of the views he expresses in this or that text. Simply put, it is
not enough to read the formal language of Clarence Thomas's opinions.
We must expand our interpretive horizon to encompass a reading of the
figure himself. My purpose in these pages is to explore one itinerary such a
double-reading might take.1 2 I mean to show that the success of Justice
10. Clarence Thomas, Rule of Law: The New Intolerance, WALL ST. J., May 12, 1993, at A15.
11. For an example of the role personal background and experience played in justifying the
presidential nomination of Thomas, see Press Conference with President Bush and Supreme
Court Justice Nominee Clarence Thomas, FED. NEWS SERVICE, July 1, 1991, available in
LEXISNexis Library, FEDNEW File. Throughout the length of the confirmation proceedings,
President Bush emphasized the fact that Thomas had grown up in the midst of poverty in the
racially segregated South. Despite this background, Bush stated that Thomas had "excelled in
everything that he has attempted." He also made extensive reference to Thomas' personal characteristics: "He is a delightful and warm, intelligent person who has great empathy and a wonderful sense of humor." He concluded by saying: "Judge Thomas' s life is a model for all Americans,
and he has earned the right to sit on this nation's highest court." See also Catharine Pierce Wells,
Clarence Thomas: The Invisible Man, 67 S.CAL. L. REV. 117, 123 (1993) (noting that Bush hoped
to undermine liberal opposition with the argument that, "[a] man like Thomas, who had personally experienced racism and discrimination, could surely be trusted to safeguard the civil rights of
others.")
12. A rhetorical reading in this context will go beyond Clarence Thomas's doctrinal defense
for a jurisprudential stance and instead examine the discursive strategies that underwrite that
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Thomas's emerging agenda on the Court derives not only, nor primarily,
from the propositional content of what he writes in his opinions and
speeches. To the contrary, Thomas's project also depends very much on
the identificatory positions from which his writings issue: we are dealing
with the personal as professional. Indeed, as I shall argue, one might go so
far as to say that the secret and the scandal of Thomas's authority in the
current Court lies in his deft deployment of what might be called the 'identitarian' style of judicial argument. In what follows, I want to indicate some
of the elements of this style, in the hope of shedding some light on two of
Thomas' more remarkable recent jurisprudential performances.
My chosen conceptual compass here is Michel Foucault's richly suggestive work on the "discursive event".13 I cannot hope to offer a detailed
account of Foucault's theory of discourse, but I do need to rehearse the key
elements of his work on which I shall draw here. Generally speaking, for
Foucault, "discourse" refers to the practice of language, to the active work
of making things mean; it is not limited to the study of the semantic or
syntactical properties of verbal or written texts. For Foucault, the effective
analysis of discursive formations requires attention to their performative
dimensions. Foucault thus shifts his focus from a static model of the text as
object to a dynamic model of the text as an event. This in turn implicates a
host of issues such as the status of the speaker or writer, the circumstances
in which the speaker or writer speaks or writes, and the social sites from
which the speaker or writer launches an utterance or text.
The crucial distinction between Foucault's project and other recent explorations of linguistic performance to which it has often been compared,
most notably the "speech act" theory of J.L. Austin and John Searle, lies in
its sustained attention to the connections between (or I might say the codependence of) discourse and power.'" Foucault develops a conception of
discursive practice as an empirical phenomenon that is underwritten by and
embedded in a complex field of social forces. Thus, he argues that "in
every society the production of discourse is at once controlled, selected,
organized and redistributed by a certain number of procedures."15 One
defense. Such a reading can help reveal the "unconscious" of the text. See Kendall Thomas, The
Eclipse of Reason: A Rhetorical Reading of Bowers v. Hardwick, 79 VA.L. REv. 1805, 1819-21
(1993).
13. MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE ARCHAEOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE 50-51 (A.M. Sheridan Smith
trans., 1972).
14. The speech act theory first expounded by Austin, and later developed by Searle, is based
on the idea that speech, like non-verbal acts, is used to accomplish a specific purpose for the
speaker. For example, speech may be used to request, announce, frighten, convince, or promise.
How a statement is actually used has a direct relationship to or bearing on its meaning. Speech
act theory identifies three different elements of any speech act: (1) the locutionary act, which is
the act of making the utterance; (2) the illocutionary act, which is the purpose of the utterance
(e.g., to make a statement, an offer, a promise, etc.); and (3) the perlocutionary act, which is the
effect of the utterance. The term "speech act" has come to be used as a short-hand reference to
the illocutionary act. The purpose, once identified, is the illocutionary force of the statement.
Speech act theorists are largely interested in the speaker's intentions in order to determine meaning. See J.L. AUSTIN, HOW To Do THINGS WITH WORDS (J.O. Urmson & Marina SbisA eds., 2d
ed. 1975); JOHN R. SEARLE, SPEECH ACTS: AN ESSAY IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE (1969),
and JOHN R. SEARLE, EXPRESSION AND MEANING: STUDIES IN THE THEORY OF SPEECH ACTS
(1979).
15. Michel Foucault, The Order of Discourse, in LANGUAGE AND POLITICS 109 (Michael J.
Shapiro ed., 1984).
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obvious instance of such a procedural constraint on discourse is the prohibition (l'interdit, which may be literally translated as "the interdict"):
"[We] know very well that we do not have the right to say everything, that
we can not speak of anything in any circumstance, that not just anyone, in a
word, can speak of anything."' 6 The combined prohibitive force of what
Foucault calls the "taboo [regarding] the object [of discourse], the ritual of
the circumstance [of discursive performance], [and] the privileged or exclusive right of the subject who speaks" operates to police the boundaries of
discourse, restricting admission and conditioning effective participation in
the "society of discourse" to those who adhere to the religious, political, or
philosophical "doctrines" that make a particular discourse a "discipline" or
body of knowledge.' 7
An example from our own 'discipline' might make these claims concrete. The dominant view of legal principles and propositions is that they
are tools with which to analyze, anticipate, avoid, or adjudicate competing
claims of right and duty. In the dominant view, the cognitive content of a
legal proposition in no way turns on whether the site of its use is a court, a
conference room, or a lecture hall. Consider the following sentence: "No
State shall make or enforce any law which shall ... deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."' 8 The dominant
view holds that as a legal proposition, this rule retains its essential character no matter where it is uttered or written, no matter who reads or says it:
whether a judge reads it in a brief, a legislative counsel puts it in a memorandum, a student memorizes it for an examination or recites it during a
mock trial, or a maintenance worker finds it typed on a scrap of paper in a
law library wastebasket. Proponents of this view would readily concede
that the meaning and application of this proposition can be contested or,
indeed, changed over time. They would agree that the different settings in
which, and purposes for which, the rule is read or spoken do make a difference. But they think that the rule remains essentially the same as an ontological matter no matter what the social or constitutional context in which
it appears. One crucial implication of this view is that the meaning of a text
of a provision such as the Equal Protection Clause can be productively (if
not exhaustively) discussed and analyzed apart from its context.
Foucault suggests another way to think about legal propositions and
the "discipline" to which they belong. (Here we might note the intellectual
and institutional resonance of this notion of organized conceptual practice
as a "discipline.") His point of departure is the line that separate texts
from contexts. In broad terms, Foucault distinguishes sentences from statements, syntactic form from signifying force. For Foucault, attention to a
context reveals that the sentence used by a judge in a courtroom does not
retain the same meaning when it is used by an actor playing the role of a
judge in a courtroom. One cannot unilaterally decide that one's utterance
of the words of the Equal Protection Clause will carry the binding authority
of a judicial pronouncement; one cannot publish a commentary on the
Equal Protection Clause in a privately printed newsletter and expect the
16. MICHEL FOUCAULT, L'ORDRE Du DISCOURS 10-11 (1971).

17. Id. at 11, 41-45.
18. U.S. Const. amend. XIV.
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fact of publication in itself to grant the status that the same words would
have in a scholarly journal, or a speech by a Justice of the Supreme Court.
We all know that there are practices of exclusion and inclusion which are
external to texts. These externalities determine how much recognition, how
much authority, a particular legal utterance will be accorded; indeed, this
process of propositional accreditation represents much of the business of
law.
Though obvious once said, left unsaid, the implications these ideas entail for an understanding of legal discourse are all too likely to be ignored.
What they suggest is that the context of an utterance is not a contingent
feature of discourse but a fundamental condition of its existence, its intelligibility and, most importantly, its power and effects. Because the powers
immanent in the discursive situation and in the location or positionality of
its participants elude a text-bound theory of discourse, we must always ask,
as Foucault puts it in The Archaeology of Knowledge:
Who is speaking? Who, among the totality of speaking individuals, is accorded the right to use this sort of language [in what settings and with
what consequence?] Who derives from it his own special quality, his
prestige, and from whom, in return, does he receive if not the assurance,
at least the presumption that what he says is true? What is the status of
the individuals who-alone-have the right, sanctioned by law or tradition, juridically defined or spontaneously accepted, to proffer such a
discourse? 19
With this conception of legal discourse as an "event that includes speaker,
words, hearers, location, language" and the like, we are now in a position
to read Clarence Thomas, as well as the racial project in which he has become the most powerful figure.
I begin with Thomas' concurring opinion in the Adarand case, to
which I have already referred. You will recall that Adarand involved a
challenge to race-based affirmative action policy adopted by an agency in
the U.S. Department of Transportation. Acting under a Congressional directive, this agency included a provision in its contracts that provided financial incentives for contractors who sought to do business with the federal
government to hire subcontractors who were controlled by socially and economically disadvantaged persons. 2° Under the governing agency regulations, contractors were required to presume that such individuals included
minorities or other individuals found to be disadvantaged by the Small
Business administration. 2 1 After it lost a government contract, the plaintiff
in the case, Adarand Constructors, filed a suit attacking the constitutionality of the race-based presumptions used in the regulatory scheme, arguing
19. Foucault, supra note 12, at 50.
20. The affirmative action policies at issue in the case, STAA and STURAA, sought to create federal programs designed to benefit socially and economically disadvantaged business enterprises. Section 105(f) of STAA and § 106(c) of STURAA both provide in pertinent part:
"[e]xcept to the extent that the Secretary determines otherwise, not less than 10 per centum of
the amounts authorized to be appropriated under this Act shall be expended with small business
concerns owned and controlled by socially and economically disadvantaged individuals as defined
by section 8(a) of the Small Business Act." See 15 U.S.C. § 637(a), Pub.L. 97-424 § 105(f), Pub.L.
100-17 § 106(c).
21. The category of disadvantaged individuals under the affirmative action policy, 49 C.F.R.
§ 23.62, was rebuttably presumed to include "women, Black Americans, Hispanic Americans,
Native Americans, Asian-Pacific Americans, [and] Asian-Indian Americans."
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that these racial classifications ran afoul of the equal protection component
of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. The Supreme Court agreed
with this argument. In an opinion written by Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor, the Court concluded that whenever government at any level,
considers race in its decisionmaking, the courts must subject such a decision
to "strict scrutiny," the most demanding level of constitutional review.22
Two years before Thomas's appointment, the Supreme Court had all but
foreclosed the adoption of race-conscious responses to racial inequity by
state and local government. In a cramped conception of the scope of national power under the Fourteenth Amendment, the Adarand decision
pressed further by imposing new limits on the federal government's authority to take race explicitly into account in addressing society-wide discrimination, unless the government could first show that it had acted to further a
compelling state interest, and had sought to further that interest through
the narrowest possible statutory or regulatory means. However, the Court
took great pains to deny the conventional wisdom that "strict scrutiny is
strict in theory, but fatal in fact." Noting that "[the] unhappy persistence of
both the practice and the lingering effects of racial discrmination against
minority groups in this country is an unfortunate reality," Justice O'Connor
insisted that the Court's opinion not be read to mean that the federal government was categorically 23forbidden from adopting race-based policies in
any and all circumstances.
Apparently, O'Connor's moderate position was too radical for Clarence Thomas. In a concurring opinion that the other Justices pointedly
declined to join, Thomas fiercely attacked his colleagues on the losing side,
Justices Stevens and Ginsburg, who would have upheld the challenged affirmative action plan. "I write separately ...

to express my disagreement

with the premise underlying Justice Stevens's and Justice Ginsburg's dissents: that there is a racial paternalism exception to the principle of equal
protection. '24 From Thomas's vantage point, the "benign" discrimination
which seeks to benefit racial groups that are "thought to be disadvantaged"
is the moral and constitutional equivalent of the "malign" discrimination
that aims to oppress a race: "In each instance it is racial discrimination,
plain and simple. '25 Thomas invokes the by now familiar argument that
the "benign" discrimination of affirmative action "[stamps] minorities with
a badge of inferiority and may cause them to develop dependencies or to
adopt an attitude that they are 'entitled' to preferences. ' 26 In language
that bears an uncanny resemblance to the language of the notorious opinion in Plessy v. Ferguson,27 Justice Thomas insists that "[government] can-

not make us equal; it can only recognize, respect, and protect us as equal

22. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (O'Connor, J., plurality)
(noting that when race-based action is necessary to further a compelling interest, such action is
within constitutional constraints if it satisfies the 'narrow tailoring' test this Court has set out in
previous cases).
23. Id. at 202.
24. Id. at 240.
25. Id. at 241.

26. Id.
27. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (finding that state-mandated racial segregation on rail cars did not violate the equal protection clause).
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before the law." 8 (In Plessy, Justice Brown wrote that "[if] the two races
are to meet upon terms of social equality, it must be the result of natural
affinities ... and a voluntary consent of individuals. Legislation is powerless to eradicate racial instincts, or to abolish distinctions based on upon
physical differences . . . If one race be inferior to the other socially, the
Constitution of the United States cannot put them on the same plane
• ..,).29

What bears noting here is the degree to which the force of Thomas's
intervention comes in large measure from the subject-position of the "I"
who writes these words. In an act of unmarked identification, the Thomas
concurrence thus operates on a double register. That is, it simultaneously
serves as an expression of race-neutral judicial umbrage and of race-conscious personal offense. Thomas attacks all but accuses the members of the
Court who would uphold the affirmative action program of being racist, not
just toward people of color in the construction industry, but toward him.
The notion of a "racial paternalism exception" is simply another name for
"black exceptionalism," of the view that the "chronic and apparently immutable handicaps" of African Americans and other racial minorities
render them unfit to compete for government contracts without the "patronizing indulgence" of whites.3"
If one is mindful of who is speaking here, it becomes clear that much
more at stake in Thomas's Adarand concurrence than the constitutionality
of the Department of Transportation's subcontractor clause requirements.
As is so often the case with Supreme Court opinions, the Thomas concurrence is the textual site of multiple and indeterminate meanings. Students
of the Supreme Court have often observed the degree to which the public
colloquy conducted in its published judgments is a sub rosa continuation of
the more private ideological skirmishes that characterize everyday life on
the Court.3 1 The identitarian rhetoric to which Thomas resorted during the
Court's conferences on Adarand - the references to his grandfather, the
recollections of his own experience of segregated economy and the likeare part of an unwritten intertext that is presupposed but never openly
pronounced in the text of his official opinion. That experiential authority
of that intertext is distilled indexically in the individual "I" who writes
"separately" and from a singular perspective which gives him a special
purchase on what it means to be a person of color in contemporary
America. Thomas's response to "racial paternalism" is to assert a judicial
claim of "racial privilege". Justice Thomas further authorizes his pronouncements on the impermissibility of racial consciousness by reference
to his membership in a larger community which neither wants nor expects
government to "make us equal."3 2 Without having to do so explicitly,
28. Adarand, 515 U.S. 200 at 240.
29. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 551.
30. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 241.
31. See Eric L. Muller, Where But For the Grace of God, Goes He? The Search for Empathy
in the Criminal Jurisprudenceof Clarence Thomas, 15 CONST. COMMENT. 225 (1998) (noting an
expectation that Supreme Court Justices' deliberations, votes, and opinions will reflect not just
what they have learned from briefs and books, but also what they have seen in their personal and
professional lives).
32. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 240.
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Thomas thus suggests that the position from which he is speaking is not
merely his own, but that of his entire race.
What makes this discursive strategy so effective is that Thomas NEVER
HAS TO MENTION THE OBVIOUS FACT THAT HE HIMSELF IS BLACK.

Since

this is something we all already know, that fact can simply go without saying. The same holds true for the fact (to paraphrase Foucault) that it is
Clarence Thomas alone of all the Court's personnel who can claim the
"right... to proffer" and profit from this implicit discursive appeal to black
identity and experience. This productive silence confers an unspoken
"speaker's benefit" on Thomas that forecloses anything like an open rebuttal from his judicial opponents. Any effective attempt by Justices Stevens
or Ginsburg to take Thomas on directly would require them call Thomas
on the implicit identitarian appeal that underwrites his position. Such an
exposure of Thomas's reliance on his racial identity is out of the question.
It would not only violate the collegial protocols of the Court (Thomas
proudly declared in a recent speech that in the Supreme Court, "[no] one is
ever called a name")3 3 ; it would invite a charge of racism, which in any
event Thomas comes just short of making. Justice Stevens is thus forced to
restrict himself to two oblique responses. The first is a reply, buried in a
footnote, to Thomas' claim that the challenged affirmative action program
stamps minority contractors with a "badge of inferiority": "This is not an
argument," writes Stevens, that "a white-owned business has standing to
advance. No beneficiaries of the specific program under attack today have
challenged its constitutionality- perhaps because their ability to opt out of
the program provides them with all the relief they need."3 4 The implication
here is that it is not minority contractors, but his minority colleague who is
obsessed with the specter of stigmatization. Stevens's second rejoinder is
to an argument made not by Thomas, but by Justice O'Connor. That response takes the form of a charge that the alleged equivalence between
"malign" and "benign" race-consciousness would "treat a Dixiecrat Senator's decision to vote against Thurgood Marshall's confirmation in order to
keep African Americans off the Supreme Court as on a par with President
Johnson's evaluation of his nominee's race as a positive factor. '35
As an exercise in constitutional interpretation, we might say Thomas's
Adarand concurrence thus cloaks his judicial practice of identity politics in
the robes of impartial constitutional method. Within the space of a few
paragraphs, Clarence Thomas repudiates, reverses and then relies on something very close to the "poisonous and pernicious" racial exceptionalism of
which he accuses Justices Stevens and Ginsburg.36
Justice Thomas follows a similar strategy in his concurring opinion in
Missouri v. Jenkins. In the Jenkins case, the Court attempted to resolve a
school desegregation case which had been the subject of protracted litigation in the federal courts. In Jenkins, the district court had ordered the
state of Missouri to fund salary increases and so-called "magnet" programs
in the Kansas City Metropolitan School District, a system whose student
33. Thomas, supra note 9.
34. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 249.

35. Id. at 245.
36. Id. at 240-241.
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population was nearly seventy percent African-American. 37 The lower
court's directives were part of an effort to prevent suburban "white flight"
by enhancing what has come to be referred to as the "desegregative attractiveness" of inner city schools. Beginning in 1865, Missouri enacted a series
of statutes and constitutional provisions mandating separate public schools
for blacks that were not completely repealed until 1976, a mere nine years
before the federal district court issued its first desegregative order. In an
opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Supreme Court held that the lower
court's continuing effort to dismantle segregation in the Kansas City
schools was beyond the constitutional powers of the federal judiciary. 38
As in Adarand, Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion which the
other majority Justices declined to join. Like the Adarand concurrence,
Thomas's opinion in Jenkins is a case study in the venting of judicial spleen.
In the first sentence, Thomas introduces what will become a recurring
theme: "It never ceases to amaze me that the courts are so willing to assume that anything that is predominantly black must be inferior. '39 A few
lines later he argues that the district court's "experiment" with the "black
youth" of Kansas City "rests on an assumption of black inferiority." 4
Again: "'racial isolation' itself is not a harm; only state-enforced segregation is. After all, if separation itself is a harm, and if integration therefore
is the only way that blacks can receive a proper education, then there must
be something inferior about blacks. Under this theory, segregation injures
blacks because blacks, when left on their own, cannot achieve. To my way
of thinking, that conclusion is the result of a jurisprudence based upon a
theory of black inferiority."4 1 It soon becomes clear, however, that
Thomas's real target is not the lower court, but one of the landmark decisions of the Court on which Thomas now sits: the 1954 opinion issued in
Brown v. Board of Education. Although he directs his attention to what he
describes as the trial court's "misreading of our earliest school desegregation case," Thomas leaves no doubt about his contempt for the justification
Earl Warren offered for the Supreme Court's judgment in Brown. One
passage in particular warrants special attention. In Brown, observes
Thomas:
[T]he Court noted several psychological and sociological studies purporting to show that de jure segregation harmed black students by generating "a feeling of inferiority" in them. Seizing upon this passage in
Brown, the District Court asserted that "forced segregation ruins attitudes and is inherently unequal." . . . The District Court suggested that
this inequality continues in full force even after the end of de jure segregation [and] seemed to believe that black students in the [Kansas City
Metropolitan School District] would continue to receive an 'inferior edu37. Jenkins v. State of Mo., 1991 WL 538841 (W.D.Mo. July 05, 1991).
38. Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995) (holding that (1) district court orders designed to
attract nonminority students from outside the school district into the school district sought a type
of interdistrict goal which was beyond the scope of the identified intradistrict violation; (2) the
order requiring across-the-board salary increases for teachers and staff in pursuit of desegregative
attractiveness was beyond the scope of the court's remedial authority; and (3) whether students
in the district are at or below national norms is not an appropriate test to determine whether the
previously segregated district has achieved partially unitary status).
39. Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 114.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 122.
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cation' despite the end of de jure segregation, as long as de facto segregation persisted ....Such assumptions and any social science research upon
which they rely certainly cannot form
the basis upon which we decide
42
matters of constitutional principle.,
After dropping a long footnote to the "harsh criticism" scholars have
directed against the studies the Court cited in Brown, Thomas returns to
his main task- the ideological demolition of Brown itself:
Segregation was not unconstitutional because it might have caused psychological feelings of inferiority. Public school systems that separated
blacks and provided them with superior education resources- making
blacks "feel" superior to whites sent to lesser schools- would violate the
Fourteenth Amendment, whether or not the white students felt stigmatized, just as do school systems in which the positions of the races are
reversed. Psychological injury or benefit is irrelevant to the question
whether state actors have engaged in intentional discrimination- the
critical inquiry for ascertaining violations of the Equal Protection Clause.
The judiciary is fully competent to make independent determinations
concerning the existence of state action without
the unnecessary and mis43
leading assistance of the social sciences.
Several points can be drawn from this argument. First, it is Justice Thomas,
and not the district court in Jenkins, who is guilty of misreading Brown. I
shall leave to one side the question whether the social science research
marshaled by the proponents of desegregation was sound. 44 Thomas may
be correct that the Court could have reached the same constitutional conclusion without the benefit of the research it cites in its famous footnote
eleven. Even if he is right, however, this criticism arguably misunderstands
the nature of the Brown Court's interest in the psychic impact of statesponsored racial segregation in public education. Justice Thomas seems
particularly incensed by Chief Justice Warren's assertion in Brown that the
separation of black and white schoolchildren "solely because of their race
generates a feeling of inferiority [among black children about] their status
in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely
ever to be undone."4 5 Thomas writes as though the Brown Court's conclusions regarding the constitutionality of race-based segregation in public
school education turned exclusively on its concern with the inner lives of
black schoolchildren. However, this language from Brown must be read
against the backdrop of the Court's views about the social meanings and
effects of racial segregation on African-Americans' subordinate "status in
the community". 46 For the Brown Court, the subjective harm ("psychological feeling") of racial inferiority cannot be separated from the social totality ("status in the community") that is both its cause and consequence.
Second, Thomas's indifference to, indeed his open antagonism toward
the notion that the specter of stigmatization may indeed be relevant in antidiscrimination analysis, stands in sharp contrast to his stated views in
42. Id. at 119-120.
43. Id. at 121.
44. See DARYL MICHAEL

SCOTT,CONTEMPT AND PITY: SOCIAL POLICY AND THE IMAGE OF

THE DAMAGED BLACK PSYCHE, 1880-1996 120 (1997); Edmond Cahn, Jurisprudence,30 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 150 (1955); GERALD ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT
SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991).
45. Brown, 347 U.S. at 494.
46. Id.
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Adarand, a decision which was issued the same day as the judgment in
Jenkins. You will recall that one of Thomas' chief arguments against the
affirmative action program at issue in Jenkins was the rather speculative
claim that the challenged policy stamps racial minorities with a "badge of
inferiority" that "may" cause people of color in the construction industry to
"develop dependencies". 47 One may rightly ask here whether Thomas can
have it both ways. If the rhetoric of inferiority has no place in one area of
constitutional discourse about race (segregation), what warrants its use in
another (affirmative action)?
Third, Thomas betrays a decidedly narrow conception of the epistemology of legal knowledge in his belief that Brown did not "need to rely
upon any psychological or social-science research in order to announce the
simple, yet fundamental truth that the Government cannot discriminate
among its citizens on the basis of race."48 The Supreme Court has used
scholarly research to inform its decisionmaking since the beginning of this
century. 49 At one level, one might read Thomas's concurrence as an injunction for a return to doctrine and black letter law (a campaign he has
recently begun to wage throughout the nation's law schools). I suspect,
however, that there is something more at stake here than mere skepticism
about theory.5" What Justice Thomas is urging is a return to the golden age
of judicial "know-nothingism" in racial equality jurisprudence.51 Thomas
seeks to secure this revanchist ideological agenda by appealing to "the simple, yet fundamental truth[s]" of the color-blind "common sense" that has
increasingly come to govern the legal and political discourse on racial
power in the post-civil rights era.
However, Thomas's case for race neutrality in his Jenkins concurrence
is undermined by the racial register of the language he uses to make it,
which is decidedly closer to the surface of the text than it is in Adarand. To
my mind, Thomas's rhetorical strategy here has little to do with the specific
facts of the case. After all, one can easily imagine an opinion in which
Thomas might have used the term "racial minority" to refer to the black
Kansas City schoolchildren whose educational future was at stake in Jenkins. As I read it, Justice Thomas's repeated use of explicit and specific
references to black racial identity serves at least two purposes. The first, as
in Adarand, is to mark-again, implicitly-his own proximate racial position
in the Jenkins case. The second is to build what amounts to a brief for black
neo-conservative cultural nationalism. Consider in this connection
Thomas's comparison of predominantly black elementary and secondary
schools with historically black colleges: "Because of their 'distinctive histories and traditions,' black schools can function as the center and symbol of
47. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 241.
48. Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 120.
49. See Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 419 at nl (1908) (referencing the brief filed by soonto-be Justice Louis D. Brandeis in support of the claim that long hours are dangerous for women.
The brief "extract[ed] from over ninety reports of committees, bureaus of statistics, commissioners of hygiene, inspectors of factories, both in this country and in Europe.")
50. Thomas is not arguing, in other words, for the superiority of undertheorized argument in
judicial decisionmaking. See Cass Sunstein, The Supreme Court 1995 Term: Foreword: Leaving
Things Undecided, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 6, (1996).
51. Charles L. Black, The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421 (195960).
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black communities and provide examples of independent black leadership,
success, and achievement." 5 2 In his zeal to defend the ideals of black neoconservative cultural nationalism, Thomas refuses to let the stubborn facts
of racial inequity get in his way. As the District Court emphasized in its
opinion, the public schools Justice Thomas holds up as a model of racial
pride provide a textbook study in material realities of urban public education: inadequate lighting; peeling paint and crumbling plaster on ceilings,
walls and corridors; loose tiles, torn floor covering, odors resulting from
unventilated classrooms; a lack of off-street parking and bus loading for
parents, teachers and students; an absence of appropriate space for many
cafeterias, libraries and classrooms; faulty and antiquated heating and electrical systems; damaged and inoperable lockers; and inadequate fire safety
systems. In short, Justice Thomas is either unwilling or unable to acknowledge that by objective measure, the Kansas City public school system remained plagued by massive and continuing racial inequality. This "simple,
yet fundamental truth" cannot be allowed to intrude upon Thomas's dream
of a new, neo-conservative Black nationalist order. Thomas's discursive
modus operandi in Jenkins and Adarand is thus fully compatible with his
recent extra-judicial campaign to promote his vision of muscular self-help
as the royal road to racial uplift in the post-civil rights era.5 3
When read against the backdrop of his extra-judicial pronouncements,
the logic of Thomas's identitarian discourse in Adarand and Jenkins is
thrown into sharp relief. I might frame what I'm trying to get at here by
way of the following formulation: Although Clarence Thomas may believe
that our Constitution is color-blind, he has consistently made the case for
this color-blind vision in terms that are fully (and unapologetically) raceconscious. In a sense, then, to view Thomas as an "Uncle Tom Justice" is
entirely to misunderstand the meaning of the racial project for which he
has come to be the chief figure.5 4 Let me explain what I mean.
I noted earlier in this essay that Thomas's insistent and recurrent references to Kansas City's black public schoolchildren in Jenkins are neither
unintentional nor insignificant. As he himself notes, the essential constitutional question (at least in his conception of the Equal Protection Clause)
is not the pigmentation of the children. I read the references to the Kansas
City schoolchildren as "black" rather than minority students as a textual
marker of Thomas's importance to the new right. As the sole black Justice,
Thomas is the only member on the Court's conservative flank who can use
52. Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 122.
53. Thomas's views thus bear a striking resemblance to and consistency with those of Booker
T. Washington. See Address by Booker T. Washington, Opening of the Cotton States' Exposition
in Atlanta, Ga., September, 1895, in SELECTED SPEECHES OF BOOKER T. WASHINGTON 32-36 (E. Washington ed. 1932); see also Gary Peller, Race Consciousness, 1990 Duke L.J.
758 (1990); KEVIN K. GAINES, UPLIFT THE RACE (1996).
54. See, e.g., JANE MAYER & JILL ABRAMSON, STRANGE JusTIcE, THE SELLING OF CLAR-

ENCE THOMAS 175 (1994) (indicating that 30% of African Americans "branded" Clarence
Thomas an "Uncle Tom"); Derrick Bell, Racial Realism, 24 CONN. L. REV. 363, 370 (1992)
("[T]he choice of a black like Clarence Thomas replicates the slave masters' practice of elevating
to overseer and other positions of quasi-power those slaves willing to mimic the masters' views,
carry out orders, and by their presence provide a perverse legitimacy to the oppression they aided
and approved."); Jack E. White, Uncle Tom Justice, TIME, June 26, 1995, at 36 (labeling Clarence
Thomas "Uncle Tom Justice").
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his racial identity to argue against the recognition of racial identity as a
positive element in constitutional anti-discrimination law. To paraphrase
Foucault, we might say that of all the Justices who sit on the Supreme
Court, it is Thomas alone who has the "right" to invest his interpretation of
the anti-discrimination principle with an implicit appeal to his own racial
identity. Thomas's willingness to engage in what might be called "identitarian argument" (openly in the Court's conferences, obliquely in his
opinions) has made him a singularly valuable weapon in the right-wing
campaign to reconfigure the constitutional politics of race and reestablish
the racial state on a new cultural and ideological foundation.
In a brilliant essay, Cindy Patton has recently described this form of
racial politics in the following terms:
The new right [has neutralized] identity by taking up identity against
identity, instead of taking it up in order to gain civil rights, breaking the
calculus that linked identity claims with access to civil rights 5 5 ....The
new right [has] severed the claim to identity from the claim to rights by
denying the relation of each to the crucial term which had come to link
them - minority. By breaking the logic that enabled historically oppressed groups to mark themselves as political subjects - and under the
very sign, culture, that had once generated community and radical oppodestroyed part of the basis for civil rights as
sition - the new
56 right [has]
we know them.
I would suggest that a similar logic informs Justice Thomas's rhetorical
strategy in Adarand and Jenkins. Despite his claimed commitment to the
ideal of color-blindness, the unacknowledged subject position from which
Thomas's identitarian jurisprudence derives its force necessarily and normatively presupposes that race continues to matter in American constitutional politics and law. The ideological aim of this jurisprudential project is
not to abolish the color line, but to redraw it.
It would be a mistake, then, to construe Thomas's identitarian colorblindness as a judicial episteme in which the notion of race has no meaning.
What Thomas's jurisprudence disavows is any meaningful constitutive relationship between race and RACISM. This disavowal, of course, requires a
categorical denial of the historical and contemporary connections between
racial identity, on the one hand, and racial power and powerlessness
(supremacy and subordination), on the other.
Thomas reductively refigures race to produce what appears to be an
abstracted, etiolated understanding of constitutional equality. "Race" is no
longer an arena or instrument of political domination, but the mere marker
of benign cultural difference. The contraction of race to a purely cultural
signifer is Thomas's first, crucial move. This rearticulated conception of
"culture-race" divests racial significations of political content or consequence. The second important move is to declare that this depoliticized
definition of "culture-race" (to borrow a term from Neil Gotanda) signifies
nothing for (or in) constitutional law.57 Race and racial identity are pre- or
55.

Cindy Patton, Refiguring Social Space, in SOCIAL POSTMODERNISM: BEYOND IDENTITY

POLMCS 216, 217 (Linda Nicholson and Steven Seidman eds., 1995).
56. Id. at 241.
57. Neil Gotanda catalogued four concepts of race that are dominant in Supreme Court ideology: status-race, formal-race, historical-race, and culture-race. Culture-race "refers to AfricanAmerican culture, community, and consciousness. Culture refers to broadly shared beliefs and
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extra-political matters that lie beyond the domain of the Constitution, and
thus cannot sustain a cognizable claim of rights under it. Indeed, race consciousness and judicial consciousness are hostile to one another at all
points. The third, decisive move is to read the Fourteenth Amendment as a
rule of racial non-recognition. Under this norm, a judge who pierces the
veil of color-blindness betrays her oath to support and uphold the Constitution. In this vision of the Constitution, the discourse of race-consciousness
is always already racist, regardless of the context in which or purposes for
which it is introduced.
I have tried to indicate how the judicial performance that both enables
and exceeds the text of Thomas's public remarks in Adarand and Jenkins
allows him to transgress the "law" of color-blindness without openly violating the rhetorical taboo on racial rhetoric. I hope by now to have shown
that an adequate account of the strategies through which Clarence Thomas
has sought to rearticulate the relationship between race and rights in
American constitutional law requires a reading not only of what he says,
but of who and what he is. A recent book has described and defended
Justice Thomas's opinions as elaborating a jurisprudence of "first principles". 58 My claim in these pages is that Thomas's more significant contribution has been his considered and consistent practice of what might
called a "first person" jurisprudence.5 9 In the reading I have offered of his
opinions, "Clarence Thomas" is less the name of an actual individual than
it is of a complex set of institutional subject-positions and identitarian subject-effects. This Clarence Thomas is a racial performance, which artfully
sets identity against identity in order to dismantle the fragile political settlement reached during the civil rights years. A reading of this Clarence
Thomas suggests that for contemporary critical scholarship on race in
American constitutional law, the currently fashionable pronouncements
about the death of identity politics are not only premature, but dangerous.

social practices; community refers to both the physical and spiritual senses of the term; and African-American consciousness refers to black nationalist and other traditions of self-awareness, as
well as to action based on that self-awareness." See Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution is Color-blind", in CRITICAL RACE THEORY 257, 258 (1995).
58. SCOTT DOUGLAS GERBER, FIRST PRINCIPLES: THE JURISPRUDENCE OF CLARENCE
THOMAS (1999).

59. The singularity of this jurisprudence is perhaps further underscored by the fact that
Thomas so often writes for himself alone.

